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Douglas S. Paauw
The Problem: Financial le3ources and Caital Reguirements
I do not belong to the school of pessimists who consider that
urserdeveloped countries such as Indonesia are necessarily hered
by an absolute shortage of domestic fiscal and financial resources
for developmzent, Nor do I believe that it need be conceded that
foreign investment or foreign aid must provide the bulk of financia
resources to support a doiestic development program, Compared to
many underdeveloped countries, Indonesia has extensive natural resomi
and unutilized factors of production which could be combined to ir>
crease output if mobilization of financial resources to provide the
complementary capital could be accomplished.2 It is indeed true
that the present rates of savings and capital formation in TIndonesia
are realtively low; although not nearly so low as we have been led
to believe. The thesis which I wish to davelop is that latent source
1. hisisa revised draft of agpper originally presented at
a joint Indonesian Embassy-Center for Internptional Studies meeting
on December 21, 1954.
2. Since discussion centers here on mobilization of financial
resources, the problem of transforming financial resources into rea
capital will not be explored. The transformetion process may in
,act be a more intractable economic problem in the short run than
mobilization of financial resources.
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of financial resources do exist, and given proper institutional
evolution and an aggressive program of action, these domestic
resources could be mobilized to contribute to a fruitful develop-
ment plan.
Repeatedly economists have been frustrated by their wrong prog-
nostications about the potentialities of financing developmental
investment in underdeveloped economies. Frequently these prognos--
tications are made on the basis of observed rates of savings and
investment. The observed rates appear so low that increasing in-
vestment adequately to maintain, much less increase, per capita
income where rapid population growth is now taking place seems
to be a virtually impossible task without substantial external aid.
Recent experience in countries where violence has been done to trad-
itional institutional structures which stood in the way of mobilizing
existent and potential resources, however, demonstrates that the
matter of financing is not necessarily a major obstacle to development.
The recent history of economic growth in India and on Mainland China
provide illuminating examples of this argument.
Recent research in Indonesia is beginning to reveal that a con-
siderably higher rate of net investment takes place than that reported
in existing estimates. Although investment may not flow into channels
leading to maximum rates of growth priors to the beginning of a devel-
opment program, it nevertheless represents the existence of resources
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which could conceivably be diverted to developmental investment
without great reductions in the level of current consumption. We will
also attempt to demonstrate that adding to the current rate of invest-
ment by providing domestic financing may go far towards meeting the
capital requirements of a program for increasing per capita output
in Indonesia.
There appear to be margins of taxable capacity in particular
sectors of the economy whiich could be reached to provide real savings
from the present patterns of output and consumption. Moreover, it
is clear that both idle and under-employed resources exist within
the present economic framework. Although more effective combination
and utilization of existing factors may indeed present formidable
problems, it should be recognized that their present state of util-
ization provides an eventual resource pool for accelerating the rate
of investment as a developmient program gets under way. However,
a steady flow of foreign capital will undoubtedly be required to
supplement domestic financial resources if Indonesia is to make
a take-off into sustained economic growth.
Unfortunately there is little analysis available to provide
reliable estimates of the amounts of capital required to achieve
given economic objectives in Indonesia, Dr. Eugene Grasberg, how-
ever, has done pioneering research in this area in his recent papers
on Indonesia's capital requirements.3 Utilizing the data made
available by Dr. Neumarkts national income study and other Indo-
nesian materials, Dr. Grasberg has estimated the order of magni-
tude of annual investment required to achieve a number of major
economic goals. These goals are:
1. Maintenance of per capita supplies of all goods and ser-
vices at 1954-1955 levels;
2. Eliminating import of food and reducing fiber imports by
25 per cent within five years;
3. Avoidance of balance of payments deficits and rebuilding
the country's foreign exchange reserves;
4 Compensating in domestic production, over a five year period,
for one-half of the reduction in non-food essential imported goods
which has occured during the recent years of retrenchment; and
5. increasing per capita consumption of all goods by two per
cent per year.
According to Grasberg's calculations, maintenance of per capita
supplies of all goods and services at 1954-1955 levels, in the face
of estimated population growth of 1 1/2 per cent per annum, would
3.
Eugene Grasberg, Indonesia's Investment Reguirements, Center
for International Studies, Document Control #C/54-9, and Indonesia's
Investment Requirements (Revised), Center for International Studies,
Document Control # E/55-20.
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require net annual.investment (in 1956) totalling approximately
Rp. 5.3 billion. If objectives i and 4 (elimination of food imports
and reduction of fiber imports by 25 per cent in five years and
compensating for one-half of recent import reductions) are added,
total net investment requirements for 1956 would rise to approximately
Rp. 6.6 billion. For the four years after 1956, investment required
to raise output enough to meet these objectives would rise slightly
as depreciation allowances rose pa passu with investment; however,
after five years, objectives 1 and 4 would be realized and investment
requirements might therefore fall by about Rp. 1.3 billion.4
If, however, the objectives included, in addition, raising per
capita consumption of all goods and services by 2 per cent per year,
required net investment outlay would rise steeply to approximately
Rp. 13 3/4 billion for 1956, Rp. 14 billion for 1957, Rp. 14 1/8
billion for 199, Rp. 14 1/3 billion for 1959 and Rp. 14 1/2 billion
for 1960.5
Sources of Finance: The Balance of Payments
I would now like to turn to the question of mobilizing the finan-
cial resources for a development program of roughly this order of
magnitude. My research has led me to believe that a large part of
*aEugene Grasberg, Indonesia's Investment Requirements (Revised),
Table 6,
5.Ibid
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the financial resources needed to meet these capital requirements
could be found domestically. But it is also my belief that these
resources, in the short-run at least, should be transferred to the
government for investment through the fiscal system rather than by
net additions to the income stream in the form of newly created money.
To establish these propositions, let us consider briefly the three
potential areas through which financial resources for development
could conceivably be mobilized.
First of all,, we might consider the feasibility of extracting
financial resources from the economy through promotion and reg-
ulation of foreign trade. The Balance of Payments could provide an
effective channel if it were possible to provide a surplus in the
current account to build up a supply of savings in the form of for-
eign currencies.6 Effective utilization of such resources would of
6 oIt should be pointed out taat Balance of Payments Controls may
be used, like other methods, to mobilize from the economy financial
resources (savings) for investment. The existence of a surplus in
current account would not, however, in and of itself, be a sufficient
condition for producing such investment, or, in fact, for producing
savings. All that is suggested here is that, with complementary pol-
icies, the existence of a surplus in the current account could serve
as a source from which financial resources for development could be
squeezed. This might be achieved, for example, by employing a "tax"
on foreign trading operations designed to limit the level of imports,
thus inducing forced savings made available by appropriate devices to
the government, or to entrepreneurs to whom it chotses to transfer these
resources. Such savings would differ from voluntary domestic savings
not so much by nature as by the means by which they would be mobilized.
In the case of savings mobilized through control of foreign trade,domestic savings would be forced by limiting the supply of import goods
for general domestic consumption.
course necessitate the use of further devices to insure that the
savings thus developed could be channeled into the kind of invest.
ment which the Indonesian development program would call for. How-
ever, analysis of Indonesia's recent Balance of Payments indicates
that prospects for mobilizing financial resources through this medium
are not very bright, at least in the immediate future. An important
characteristic of post-independence Balance of Payments has been a high
level of liabilities in the invisible account. These items comprise
relatively fixed obligations which cannot be reduced in any given
year or even during a period of years in the near future. The main
items have been transfers representing income on investment and costs
of foreign technicians (including pensions for previous civil servants)
of which a substantial part has been set in treaty agreements with
Holland. A survey of Indonesia's Balance of Payments for 1953 will
emphasize the nature of the problem; in that year the reported value
of commodity exports amounted to approximately Rp. 7.7 billion compar..
ed to imports of about Rp. 7.2 billion. If proceeds from export duties
are deducted from the value of commodity exports, however, commodity
account shows a deficit of one-half billion rupiah. On the other hand,
the deficit on the invisibles account amounted to Rp. 2 billion and
the debit balance of long-term capital items approximated one-fourth
billion rupiah. Thus the total Balance of Payments deficit was
equal to approximately two and three-fourths billion rupiah. Hence,
w7clo
if savings were to be mobilized through the Balance of Payments, a
commodity export surplus would 'iave to be produced to overcome what
now appears to be a relatively permanent deficit in the invisibles
account. The other alternative of course, would be further reduc-
tions in the level of imports; Iere again, prospects appear to be
rather dubious. Indonesia has already followed a strictly enforced
policy of import controls, reducing imports to what I believe is
near a minimum level consistent with the present level of production
in the economy. In 1954 imports consisted mainly of food and other
necessities, raw materials to maintain Indonesian production and capi-
tal goods to provide maintenance of Indonesia's productive resources
intact. As we will argue below, these facts emphasize the need for
foreign capital to meet at least an important part of the import
component of a development program.
However, in the longer run there may be some hope of achieving
a level of exports adequate to mobilize financial resources for
development from foreign trading operations. This result, in the
last analysis, depends both on increasing t ie present level of exports
and holding the line on - or reducing - the level of imports. The
latter presumably is dependent on increasing domestic output of goods
now imported. During the last three months of 1954, prices of rubber
and other agricultural exports rose significantly, and export earn~
ings in 1954 are reported to have exceeded the 1953 level by Rp. 200
million, Since imports have been cut by Rp. 800 million below the
1953 level the efrective 1954 current account deficit is estimated
to be c:a4ly Rp. 50) milliona These results have been achieved in
part t irough diverse and sometimes discrininatory export promo.
tion 1 policies which appear to have increased the volume of exports
over the 1951. and 1952 levels. However, during this period, the
re.-overy of exports from agricultural estates, which has taken place
.n spite cf rather than as a result of government policies, has
been the major factor in tie slow growth of exports. In the lnger
run, tbre is no question but that a development program itself will
add tr Indonesiats capacity to earn through exporting. However, it
shoud be emphasized that significantly increased export earnings
wilL depend on technological improvements providing for, among other
t:-ings, industrial processing of agricultural raw materials. Such
mprovements can only be obtained by increased investment in this
particular sector. The results of this investment will appear after
a rather lengthy gestation period and will be hampered by relatively
high capital-output ratios0  Thus in the short run, financing of
Indonesian economic growth of the required magnitude will have to
come mainly from other sources.
7National Planning Bureau "Indonesia's Economic and Social
Developments in 1954", Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, VIII, (1955)
Table II, 419.
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These considerations are made rather academic, however, by
the fact that Indonesia's major efforts in this field are currently
being made to build up her foreign exchange reserves which have
fallen to dangerously low levels in the years since 1952. By mid-
1954, it became necessary for the government to suspend the 20 per cent
gold and foreign exchange reserve requirement behind tie current
liabilities of the Central Bank, thus drawing attention to the necessity
of further restricting imports to improve the foreign exchange position
of the country. For some time to come, therefore, Indonesia's Bal-
ance of Payments problem is likely to be regarded as one concerned
with accumulating foreign exchange for reserve purposes rather than
to provide financial resources for development.
However, all of this overlooks one of the most essential char-
acteristics of the' Indonesian Balance of Payments: the extreme
sensitivity of export earnings to fluctuations in world prices for
primary products. As in other primary-producing economies, Indonesia's
export earnings were swollen by the international stockpiling boom
during the Korean War. However, as elsewhere, the resulting wind-
fall profits-many in hard currencies-were dissipated in the finan-
cing of non-essential imports and internal inflation.8 For long-
term financing of economic development, therefore, it would be
8 See Douglas Copland, Problems of the Sterling Area, 1953,
especially 20-28.
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desirable to capture a share of these periodically large foreign
exchange resources by appropriate fisac1 and financial measures
during periods of booms in the markets for primary products. These
resources could be graliually invested in a development program to
avoid the consequences of their expenditure during boom situations
with inherent inflationary tendencies.
Sources of Finance: Mobilization of Voluntar Savings or Inflation
Government Borrowi
In the second place, we might consider the feasibility of finan.
cing Indonesian economic development through public or private mobil.
ization of voluntary savings or alternatively, through creation of
new money. In financing investment operations in the econorgy during
the past five years, the banking system and the government have had
little success in mobilizing voluntary savings from the economy. The
growth of savings accounts and even of active private deposit accounts
has been extremely small relative to the credit extended through the
Indonesian credit complex. It is clear that the supply of money has
grown as rapidly as savings accounts in the banking system and govern-
ment agencies (such as the Post Office Savings Bank). Throughout the
period since the transfer of sovereignity the ratio of savings deposits
to total money supply has held fairly steadily near 3 per cent, compared
to 19 per cent for India and about 45 per cent for the United States.9
Douglas S. Paauw, "inancing Economic Development in Indonesia:
Public and Private Mobilisation of Voluntary Savings", Ekonomi dan
Keuangan Indonesia, VIII, (1955), 209.
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Rather than performing a function in mobilizing savings to finance
the economy's investment, the banking system in Indonesia-with the
exception of larg7e foriegn banks-has been heavily subsidized by the
government. 1 0 It appears highlr doubtful, therefore, that the banking
system will be available to mobilize savings to finance either private
or public developmental expenditures in the near future.
During this same period (1950 to the present) the government has
operated, with the exception of one year, at relatively large ddficits,
financed primarily by inflationary borrowing from the Central Bank0
The Minister of Finance reported in June, 1955, that post-independence
deficits totalled Rp. 9,966 million by the end of 1954, of which
Rp. 6 ,5m illion was financed by borrowing from the Bank Indonesia.
He forecast a further deficit of Rp. 2,537 million for 1955.3 Through
stringent stabilization policies the inflationary effects of this
borrowing was held 'in check until 1954.12 However, by 1955 new and
frightening inflationary tendencies were apparent, and it was clear
that continued inflationary financing on the scale recently under-
taken would seriously undermine the stability of the Indonesian ec-
onog. 1 3
Ibid, 210, 213.
31 Antara, (Indonesian Edition), June 14, 1955
12 Benjamin Higgins, Economic Stabilization and Development in
Indonesia, (Revised mimeographed edition, 1955), 20-21.
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Limited evidence points to the conclusion that the pre-1954
stabilization policies of the Indonesian Government were effective
in "neutralizing" at least part of the new money put into circulation
through deficit financing. It appears that the velocity of money in
circulation was reduced and that cash and near-cash balances grew
rapidly in this periodlheld against the day when they could be con-
verted into the desired (primarily imported) goods. However, with
the appearance of active inflationary tendencies in 1955, it appears
that these balances are putting increased pressure on the free market
rate of the rupiah and domestic commodity prices as attempts are made
to convert cash balances into goods or foreign currencies as domestic
price rises are becoming more ominous.
It should be pointed out, incidentally, that the existence of
these balances in the face of inflationary pressures does not augur
well for the mobilization of private savings as a deflationary means
of financing economic development. To the extent that these balances
would be mopped up for transfer to the government for development
financing, their impact would be as inflationary as the creation of
new money. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the owners of these balances
1 Ibid, 21-22
Scheffer, C.F., "A Note on One Monetary Analysis by the
Governor of the Bank Indonesia...", Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia,
VII, (1954), 652-657; National PlanningBureau, "Indonesia's Economic
and Social Developments in 1954", Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia,
VIII, (1955), 360-361o
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would be willing to part with liquidity by purchasing government
securities or gaining title to savings accounts, If they are held
for the motives suggested above, and are already being converted to
goods as a result of inflationary price rises, their owners undoubt-
edly wish to maintain the highest degree of liquidity by continuing
to hold cash.
Sources of Finance: the Fiscal System
If these observations are correct, the use of inflationary finan.-
cing to support either current or developmental expenditures will
have a multiplier effect on prices as inflation induced by the govern-
ment deficit shakes loose the cash balances withheld from previous
income streans. The launching of a development program in the con-
ditions of this monetary overhang implies that inflationary financing
must be restricted if economic stability is to be maintained. Hence
it is my contention that during the first years of development, finan-
cing should come mainly from reductions in current consumption forced
through fiscal measures. It should be recognized, however, that even
this type of provision for the financing of developmental investment
may have inflationary aspects. This is true since the monetary stream
itself will not be contracting, while the flow of goods for consump-
tion purposes will be reduced as a greater share of current resources
are devoted to production of investment goods. On the other hand,
the output increases that will eventually emerge from developmental
--k
investment will not appear immediately. The gestation period before
investment fructifies in outpu will vary from project to project,
but in any case there will be considerable delay in output responses
to investment. An inflationary gap will exist until the supply of
consumption goods reaches (and exceeds) its original level. The in-
flationary consequences could be reduced by successively taxing away
this gap in each economic period. It is also possible that the gap
might disappear through enforced reduction in the propensity to con-
sume among the higher income groups if luxuries and semi-luxuries
upon which these groups were accustomed to spend a part of their in-
comes were made totally unavailable. As output increases result from
the development program, the decision concerning allocation of these
increments between resources for an increased rate of investment and
provision for increased consumption will have to be made.
From our review of the feasibility of financing development from
foreign trading operations, by mobilization of voluntary savings or
through government deficit financing by creation of new money, it
appears that financing a significantly increased rate of investment
without deleterious inflationary consequences will require major
reliance on the central and local fiscal processes. The level of
net investment now being performed by the economy through both public
and private channels provides a useful point for a development program
thus financed. The existence of these investment resources rr se
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however, does not imply that their present employment will lead to
realization of the economic objectives for which capital requirements
have been estimated above. Hence, some re 2irection of investment
now carried out by public bodies may be required to eventually meet
the objectives of raising per capita consumption.
Before turning to the search for new investment resources avail-
able through fiscal devices, the present level of net investment accom-
plished by the economy as a whole requires attention. In this con-
nection, the Neumark estimate of investment performed by the Indonesian
economy in 1952 should be regarded as unrealistically low. Although
Neumark reported gross investment approximating 4 1/2 billion rupiah
in this particular year, his estimate for net investment works out to
only 600 million rupiah.15 This is well below the level which appears
to emerge from a more detailed Indonesian study based on the year 1953.16
This study placed gross investment at approximately Rp. 9 billion, of
which Rpo 1.6 billion represented capital formation by the central gov-
ernment. Employing the most realistic depreciation rates now available
for the economy as a whole and correcting for somewhat lower depreciation
Neumark, D.S., "The National Income of Indonesia", Ekonomi dan
Keuangan Indonesia, VII, (1954), 357-358. The estimate of net invest-
ment has been obtained by subtracting Neumark's estimate of depreciation
in the economy (Rp. 4,296.8 million) from his estimate of gross investment,
16 This estimate was near completion in 1954 and was shown to the
present writer. It has not yet been released for publication. In con-
trast to the Neumark estimate, the study referred to here is based on
extensive reports on private investment as well as analysis of govern-
ment accounts,
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of governmental facilities, 1 7 this study would point to a level of
net investment in 1953 approximating Rp. 4.7 billion. However,
even this estimate does not take account of the substantial amounts
of investment carried out at the local levels of government and
not subsidized by the central government.18 Such investment, not
reported in government accounts, was estimated to be somewhat in
excess of Rp. 1 billion in 1953.19 With this addition we arrive at
an estimAate of net investment for 1953 amounting to Rp. 5.7 billion.20
This estimate may be considered as a provisional measure of the econ-
orry's investment performance in a representative year. From our
point of view, this lump of investment is regarded as a credit against
the capital requirements specified above, to which new investible
resources may be added,
17 Neumark employed a depreciation rate of 5 per cent for the
economy as a whole and points out that this rate compares favorab],y
with those current in neighboring Southeast Asian countries. Neumark,
op. cit., 357.
18 The 1953 estimate of gross investment included only local
investment directly subsidized by the Ministry of Interior, and docu-
mented in central government expenditure reports.
19 Douglas S. Paauw, "The Role of Local Finance in Indonesian
Economic Development", Ekoromi dan Keuangan Indonesia, VIII, (1955), 12
0 As argued above, this indicates a higher level of investment
than that usually reported for Indonesia. Assuming Indonesian Gross
National Product was 10 per cent greater in 1953 than Neumark reported
for 1952, gross investment would approximate 11 per cent of G.N.P0
The latest estimate reported alsewhere places this ratio at 5 per cent.
Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, Report No. 6672
(August 25, 1954), 3.
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It is difficult to document from empirical studies the exist-
ence of areas of taxable capacity which could be reached to mobilize
resources for development through the fiscal system without socially
harmful effects on levels of consumption. Yet certain general con-
clusions appear to be warranted from analysis of recent data and the
beginnings of empirical research. In the first place, it seems safe
to conclude that income has risen in the rural sector of the econong
relative to the non-rural sector. 21 Secondly, recent studies indicate
that in some areaq at least,a new class of relatively high income
recipients has emerged in the rural sector 2 2 and that similarly, in
some localities general per capita income increases have been real-
ized. 2 3 Thirdly, it is clear that the tax burden upon the rural sector
has fallen relative to incomes in this sector and that the rising in-
comes among particular groups and localities are,by and large, escaping
tax levies on marginal income increases.2 4 Finally, there is evidence
21 Neumark, op. cit., 351, for example, reports that "farmers...
were absolutely and relatively better off in 1951 and 1952 than in
1938." Also see Douglas S. Paauw, "The Tax Burden..." loc, cit., 568.
22 This conclusion, reported in my article, "The Tax Burden...",
loc. cit., 571 emerges from unpublished studies undertaken by the
Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of Indonesia.
23 Douglas S. Paauw, "The Role of Local Finance in Indonesian
Economic Development", Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, VIII, (1955), 13.
J.A. van Veen, "Some Notes on 'The Tax Burden and Economic
Development in Indonesia'," Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, VII, (1954),
766-767- and Douglas S. Paauw, "The Role of Local Finance...", loc. cit.,8, 1.3-* Z om
-19-V
which suggests that significant amounts of underemployed factors of
production exist in the rural sector of the economy and that these
too may be mobilized for investment purposes through fiscal operations
of the lower levels of government.25 This method of investment finan-
cing is already effectively employed in some areas of Indonesia.
In the non-rural sector of the economy, relatively high tax rates
26are assessed against personal and business incomes; where these
rates are effectively enforced they probably now stand near the point
of seriously affecting production incentives. However, even in this
sector, strict enforcement of the legal rates of these taxes against
liable income is found only in the larger cities where central fiscal
offices are actually located. In outlying cities and towns, an
attempt is made to enforce these taxes by periodic visits from repre-
sentatives of these offices. In addition, however, the central fiscal
offices in the various provinces, provided with small enforcement staffs,
are responsible for collecting a- large number of low-yielding taxes,
many of which involve complex enforcement procedures. With relief from
responsibility for collecting these relatively unremunerative levies,
25 Douglas S. Paauw, "The Role of Local Finance", Loc. Cit.,9-11.
26 The effective income tax rates in force today begin at 3 per
cent and rise to 55 per cent, with a marginal rate of 75 per cent
applicable on each 100 rupiah of income above Rp. 300,000. The cor-
poration tax rates vary from 40 to 52 1/2 per cent of net profits with
lower rates (25 to 40 per cent) in force for new firms during the
first five years of their existence.
the addition of collection personnel and improved communications,
fiscal officials in the areas studied indicated th'at yields from
the two major revenue producers under their jurisdiction in areas
outside Djakarta could at least 1e doubled.27  Allowing for the loss
of revenue from abolishing such high-cost collection taxes as the
reconstruction tax (a tax on restaurants), the urban real estate
tax and the household property tax, it is estimated that strict
enforcement of the income tax and corporation tax in the non-rural
sector could increase revenues by 1/2 to 1 billion rupiah.28
Direct taxation of the rural sector of the econorVy-which is the
prerogative of the central government-is currently undertaken through
a complex division of labor between the central government's fiscal
offices in localities and local officials, Under the Dutch, rural
incomes were taxed by means of a land tax, abolished by the Indo-
nesians in 1951. In its place, so-called "rural income tax"
(padjak peralihan ketjil) was established to tax income in the rural
sector, applicable not only to income from land but to all income
outside the reach of tax authorities in larger cities and towns. The
land tax had been administered by the Dutch, typically, through their
system of indirect rule. Local officials, supervised by central
27 Douglas S. Paauw, "The Role of Local Finance...", Loc. cit., 8.
28 This estimate is based on tax collections for the year 1953
and is calculated from data on yields from income taxation by sectors
made available to the author by the Ministry of Finance.
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authorities, performed the actual collection of the tax, retaining a
specified percentage of their collections as personal income. When
the rural income tax was put into effect by the Indonesians in 1951,
the central government did not have adequate administrative personnel
to enforce the tax directly. As a result, this tax, too, has been
farmed out to local officials for collection, with some important
variations between Java and the Outer Islands* On Java, the rural
income tax resembles the colonial land tax in almost every detail.
Local officials are responsible for its collection up to specified
amounts, 29 and it continues to be a tax on land collected at norinal
rates in force before World War 11 The local collecting official
is still allowed to retain a personal share of revenues collected.
On the Outer Islands, the tax is collected exclusively by local
officials, theoretically supervised by the central fiscal offices
in the locality. In practise central officials rarely penetrate into
the villages. In these areas, where the colonial land tax never had
a firm foothold, the rural income tax, to the extent it is enforced,
is assessed at the progressive rates which the 1951 statute provides0
In 1953, total income tax collections received by the central
government from the rural sector amounted to only Rp. 66 million;
29 Rupiah 3,400 in East Java; Rupiah 5,000 in West Java.
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with proceeds of Rp. 30 million from Java and Rp. 36 million from
the Outer Islands., Yet the rural sector produced in 1952 Rp. 65.2
billion of Indonesia's national income of 81.6 billion(81 per cent
of the total).30 The rural income tax contributed less than 1 per
cent of total tax collections in 1953, compared with land tax coll-
ections comprising 7 per cent of the total in 1939.
In terms of aggregative statistics, therefore, it appears that
direct taxation of the rural sector of the econon is ineffective
in mobilizing resources for the finance of government expenditures,
current or developmental. This conclusion is borne out by empirical
research in localities on Java and the outlying islands. Upper in-
comes in the rural sector received by traders, lenders and landlords
are by and large not reached by income taxation; on Java local collec-
tors attempt to keep incom assessments low enough to be liable to
local collection so they may share in the proceeds. On Sumatra, tax
collectors-who are in fact local officials-make no effort to maximize
income tax collections in the rural sector since all receipts are
turned over to the central government. In one area, on Sumatra, a
drive by central tax officials to enforce taxation of upper incomes
in the rural sector, tripled central receipts.'~
30 Douglas S.'Paauw, "The Tax Burden...", Loc.cit., 568,
31 Douglas S. Paauw, "The Role of Local Finance...", Loc. cit., 80
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In the areas of Indonesia which I investigated, local fiscal
officials at the provincial, kabupaten, and village levels indicated
that the transfer of the rural income tax to these levels of govern-
ment would in all probability make them financially independent of
the central government and would also permit a higher rate of local
investment. 3 2 In 1953, central subsidies to local governments amount.-
ed to Rp. 1.9 billion, If the rural income tax were transfered to
local levels of government, where it could be more effectively collected,
central government subsidies for the finance of local government could
be considerably reduced if not eliminated. A conservative estimate
of the savings realised by the central government budget through this
transfer and the consequent reduction of subsidy might place the abso-
lute figure between Rp. 1 to 1.5 billion. It is clear that the central
government itself will not have the administrative facilities to mobil-
ize collections in this amount from the rural income tax for an indef-
inetly long time.
Financial resources for development might well be provided by
paring down the level of non-subsidy current expenditures supported
by the central budget. Recent students of the Indonesian budget
have suggested that strenuous economy efforts by the various Ministries
represented in the budget could result in reducing current expendi-
tures by at least Rp. 1 billion, while the existing level of admin-
istration could be maintained.
3 2 These levels of government now have no important, legally
provided sources of income.
A more controversial item in the search for new investment
resources for development is the amount of new local investment which
might be encouraged by fiscal and administrative reform which would
grant increased autonomy to local levels of government. The invest-
ment operationsof provincial and kabupaten levels of ,overnment now
require central government approval of investment plans, and central
financing. Yet apart from capital items and technical personnel, these
projects could be financedt Iecally, in large part from underemployed
labor resources. In the areas of Indonesia which I visited, I found
a dramatic urge for local improvement through local investment pro-
jects. In these areas, provincial and kabupaten fiscal officals
strongly indicated that if they were given carte blancle on planning
and financing of investment projects within their jurisdiction, the
amount of local investment realized could be significantly increased.
While it is extremely hazardous to place a statistical value on the
amount of new investment resources which could be mobilized through
the extension of greater autonomy to localities (including transfer
of the rural income tax) an estimate of a 50 to 100 per cent increase
in local capital formation above that estimated for the year 1953
appears to be conservative.3h This would provide ad litional investment
On Java and Sumatra local officials consistently estimated
that this change would double the current rate of local investment.
We have estimated total local investment for 1953 at Rp. 1 1/h billiono
resources at local levels of government from Rp. o5 to 1 billion.
We are now in 'a position to put together our total estimate of
investment resources available to the economy plus those which may
be mobilized through the fiscal changes suggested here. This estimate
may then be compared with our estimates of capital required to pro-
duce specified rates of economic growth. The results of our analysis
are presented in Table I.
TABLE I
Total Investment Resources (Domestic)
(In billions of rupiah)
A0 Estimated Actual Investment (1953);
Gross 9.0
Depreciation 4o3
Net T~7
Addition of unreported
local investment 100
Corrected net total
B. Additional Potential Investible Resources:
1. Increased yields from business
and personal income taxation .5 to 1
2o Increased yields from rural income
taxation (Reduction of subsidies
to localities) 1 to 1.5
3, Reduction in durrent central
expenditures 1
4. Increased local investment .5 to 1
Subtotal (B) 3 to 4.5
8.7 to 10.2Co Total
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This estimate of the economy's present investment resources is
based on the estimated level of net investment now being performed
by the economy plus fiscal resources waich could be mobilized for deve,
lopn.ent at exisidng tax rates and given a reduction in current ex-
penditures of about 7 per cent below the 1953 level. Item 1 in the
above table, net increase in yields from business and personal income
taxation (1/2 to 1 billion rupiah), requires stricter enforcement of
existing tax rates in the urban sector and the abandonment of minor
revenue producers which are costly in terms of administration. Item
2, increased yields from rural income taxation (1 to 1 1/2 billion
rupiah), requires transfer of this tax to local governments. This
transfer would add to central resources for investment by reducing
subsidies to localities, now running at about Rp. 2 billion per
year. Item 3, reduction in current central government expenditures
(1 billion rupiah), requires more stringent budgetary control and
somewhat simplified administration. Item 4, increased local invest.
ment (1/2 to 1 billion rupiah), requires granting greater autonomy
to localities in investment activities, including the right to mobil-
ize resources locally.
Apart from the reductions in the current expenditures of the cen-
tral government, increased resources for developmental investment are
35 Excluding reduced subsidies to localities.
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to be derived from taxable capacity theoretically subject to existing
tax provisions but actually unreached by present tax enforcement. The
estimates presented in Table I, therefore, are nothing more than an
attempt to locate and quantify the potential yields from areas of
taxable income presently outside the scope of enforcement. These
estimates should be regarded as rough approximations made without
the support of satisfactory statistical materials; the margin of error
may be as high as 50 per cent in either direction. Nevertheless, there
is evidence that tax yields can significantly be increased by stricter
enforcement of existing tax legislation in the areas indicated and by
the changes in inter-governmental fiscal relations suggested.
Of the total of new investible resources detailed in table I,
Rp. 1 1/2 to 2 1/2 billion comprise effective reductions in the level
of consumer expenditures or savings (increased central and local tax'
revenues); Rp. 1 billion represents the diversion of present govern-
ment expenditures tor resources for current purposes to investmentS and
Rp. 1/2 to 1 billion represents direct local mobilization of currently
unemployed or underemployed resources. If the assumptions made are
realistic, this means that goods available for consumption need be re-
duced by Rpo 1 1/2 to 2 1/2 billion to provide financing on the scale
posited in table I. With enforcement of business and personal income
taxation in the suggested areas of taxable capacity this increased tax
take would presumably come largely from the category"other goods and
services"-non-food and non-essentials- available for consumption
in 1956 whose value is estimated to reach Rp. 11.65 billion if
Grasberg's minimum capital requirements are met. Since tax
rates applicable for business and personal income taxation are
highly progressive, this additional levy would be presumed to
leave consumption of food and other necessities (estimated to
total Rp. 72.3 billion in 1956) relatively untouched.
The total of these resources obviously goes far toward meeting
the estimated capital requirements, referred to above, necessary to
raise per capita consumption by 2 per cent per year. At their min-
imum, present investment plus the addition investible resources in
table I would provide financing for net investment totalling Rp. 8.5
billion in, for example, 1956 as against estimated capital require-
ments of Rp. 13 3/4 billion, leaving a gap of Rp. 5 1/h billion
(approximately 460 million U.S. dollars), At their maximum, total
investible resources under the program suggested here would total
Rp. 10.2 billion leaving a domestic financial gap of Rp. 3.55 billion
(approximately 310 million U.S. dollars).
The estimates of the rate of domestic investment presented here
suggests that the Indonesian economy today is capable of maintaining
the 1954-1955 levels of per capita consumption, limited though they
Grasberg, o Table 5.
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were. by the government's retrenchment policies. Grasberg's estimate
of net investment necessary to achieve this goal was placed at Rp. 5.3
billion; we have estimated that net investment totalling Rp. 5.7 billion
was accomplished in 1953. However, the rate of investment now performed
is scarely adequate to restore levels of consumption to position of
1952 before retrenchment was begun, and is inadequate to build up the
country's foreign exchange reserves by gradual reduction of the import
of items which can be produced in Indonesia. This underlines the nec-
essity for mobilizing additional financial resources for an aggressive
development program if at the minimum, short run economic stability is
to be pursued.
The public component of developmental investment required to meet
targeted growth rates might well be reduced b, the expansion of dom.
estic private investment. It is reasonable to expect that private
investment would increase in the atmosphere of expansion created by
a government sponsored development program. New profit opportunities
should arise as external economies, industrial raw materials and an
increasingly skilled labor force emerge. It would be hoped that the
expansion of private investment could be financed by mobilization of
voluntary savings from current income through private banking channels;
in fact, government policy should be aimed at developing the Indonesian
banking system to assume, at a minimum this role in the financing of
Indonesian economic development. 3 7
3 7 This point is expanded in my paper, "Financing Economic Develop-
ment in Indonesia: Public and Private Mobilization of Voluntary Savings."1,
loc. cit.
The Importance of Foreign Capital
An inflow of foreign capital to complement the mobilization of
domestic investible resources in financing Indonesian economic dev-
elopment is important, in fact critical, for a number of reasons.
In the first place, the mobilization of domestic resources without
inflationary consequences, under the conditions described in this
paper, falls short of the estimated capital requirements needed to
provide significant increases in per capita output. Moreover, at the
present level of government expenditures (about Rp. 35 billion per
year gross), the government has been operating at an annual budget-
ary deficit averaging about Rp. 3 billion. The deficit has been finan.-
ced almost exclusively by inflationary methods (primarily borrowing
from the central bank) resulting in severe pressures on domestic price
levels. Unless external funds are made available, a development pro-
gram of the size indicated by the estimate of Indonesia's capital
requirements would require continnued inflationary financing by the
government. In the nascent inflationary conditions now existing in
Indonesia, continued inflationary stimuli would jeopardize both the
economy's stability and development.e Experiments in inflationary
38 Indonesia's National Planning Bureau has recently emphasized
the importance of reducing inflationary pressures if economic devel-
opment is to be seriously undertaken. In their recent report the '
following- statement is put forth, "The Five-years Development Plan,
which is now a subject of study of the Planning Bureau, would not be
workable if a persistent budgetary deficit disturbing the necessary
economic balance, is not eliminated in a reasonable period of time"
National Planning Bureau, "Indonesia's Economic and Social Develop-
ment in 1954" Loc. cit., 411.
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financing in Indonesia in the past few years have demonstrated that
increases in money supply have failed to produce complimentary in-
creases in output. Although it is clear that underemployed factors
of production exist in particular sectors of the econorgy, they have
not, by and large, been brought into productive use by the increase
in demand generated by deficit financing.
An inflow of foreign capital is also required to meet the for--
eign exchange requirements involved in launching a development program
on thqe scale considered here. In an economy with an underdeveloped
industrial structure, an important share of the physical capital goods,
for development, and in the case of Indonesia, of the raw materials for
industrial production, must in the short-run be obtained from abroad.
We know little about the required foreign trade ingredient of capital
formation in countries at the stage of Indonesia's development, but
a preliminary estimate may be ventured on the basis of Indonesia's
own experience and estimated requirements in other underdeveloped
economies.
In 1953, the year eraployed as the basis of the present estimates,
imports of physical capital goods totalled Rp. 1.44 billion (about
14 per cent of estimated gross investment) and imports of raw materials
totalled about Rp. 2.6 billion (about 26 per cent of estimated gross
investment). Combined, therefore, .imported capital goods for domestic
investment and raw materials-in large part fabrics for the textile
industry-for industrial production represented about 40 per cent of
realized gross investment. 'Imports in these categories were given
priority in import licensing and were achieved only at the expense of
severe limitation of imported consumer goods. It is realistic to be-
leive that the ratio of the imported capital component to total invest<-
ment would rise as a development program got underway. Investment real-
ized in the Indonesian economy in 1953, apart from government capital
formation, appears to have been accomplished predominantly in the agri-
cultural sector, small-scale industry and construction, In these see-
tors, the performance of investment is less capital intensive than in
the extension of the economy's social overhead investment and the dev-
elopment of an industrial base which are dominant in Indonesia's pre-
sent five year plan.39
If the allocation of Indonesian investment in the next five years
follows the contours of this five year plan, it is reasonable to
suppose that the import component of gross investment would be slightly
more than double the present rate (14 per cent). If the Planning Bureau
estimate of 50 per cent in foreign exchange costs (for the five year plan)
39 The proposed allocation of investment resources in this plan
among major sectors is as follows: Industry and mining, 25 per cent;
public power and irrigation, 25 per cent; transport and communications,
25 per cent; education, health and other social, 13 per cent; agri-
culture and transmigration, 12 per cent. Dr. Djuanda, Director of the
National Planning Bureau estimated that it would be necessary to devote
50 per cent of the investment resources to meet foreign exchanae costs
of these investment projects. Antara Daily Newsbulletin, Amsterdam
edition, March 17, .1955, 1.
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is employed for the additional gross investment called for by the
Grasberg estimates to bring per capita consumption increases of 2
per cent (Rp. 8.2 billion), the average import component would work
out to approximately 30 per cent.40 If anything this estimate would
be on the conservative side since the present pattern of investment
might be partially shifted to sectors where investment would require
a higher import component. To a limited extent, this would be offset
by the fact that the pattern of financing outlined here would in part
rely on the use of localized resources for labor-intensive investment.
It appears clear that foreign exchange requirements of this order
of magnitude will remain beyond the foreign exchange earning capacity
of the Indonesian economy over the life of a short-run development
program (e.g. 5 years), thus underlining the need for foreign capital
in financing the development program. Since 1952, the Indonesian gov-
ernment has strictly limited the use of foreign exchange for the import
of consumer goods; import of capital equipment and raw materials have
comprised an increasingly large share of the country's total importshl
40 The present level of gross investment is estimated to be RP. 10
billion with an existing import component of 14 per cent. For additional
investment (Rp. 8.2 billion) the five year plan estimate of a 50 per cent
import component is employed. Thus:
14. x 55 + 50 x 45 - 30.2
100
41 45.3 per cent in 1952 53.8 per cent in 1953 and 57.9 per cent
in 1954 (January to September 5 , Bank Indonesia Bulletin, Third Quarter,
1954 (Djakarta, 1954), 19.
Ia.34es
By 1954, it was apparent that the import of consumer goods could be
reduced no further without reductions in the supply of basic nec-
essities in the economy. In fact, in that year it was felt that,
"there are liitations that can be achieved in the consumption sector
(of the import accounts); after a certain point further reductions in
supplies being increasingly difficult to bear. Therefore, to achieve
the required decrease in foreign exchange expenditure some reductions
in the productive sector (of the import account) were unavoidable."2
Even so the import of consumer goods was reduced 33 1/3 per cent below
the 1953 level. 4 3 On the other hand, as we have pointed out above, the
ability of the economy to earn significantly greater amounts of foreign
exchange in the short-run is extremely doubtful, barring fortuitous rises
in world prices for Indonesia's major exports. What surpluses are
to come,
earned mustfor sometime/be used to build up Indonesia's foreign ex-
change reserves. Thus it seems safe to conclude that the import of
capital goods for an expanded development program cannot be financed
from increased export earnings or by providing foreign exchange from
42 National Planning Bureau, "Indonesia's Economic and Social
Developments in 1954", loc. cit., 369. Parenthesis are my addition.
43 Ibid, 369.
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further reductions in the level of consumer goods imports.
Employing the 'assumed ratio of foreign capital goods to gross
investment (30 per cent), a development program aimed at providing
annual per capita consumption increases of 2 per cent would involve
Rp. 5.46 billion in direct import costs.4 In 1953, the most recent
year for wnich complete statistics are available, the economy was
providing capital imports totalling Rp. 1.44 billion. Assuming this
rate will be maintained in the short run, the development program out-&
lined here would entail Rp. 4.02 billion (about U.S. $350 million) in
foreign exchange costs for realizing invostment. Like investment re-
quirements themslves, these costs would increase each year as a larg-
er base against which replacement for depreciation must be made is
accumulated.
Financing Economic Development in Indonesia: Some Implications
We have sought to establish the thesis that a program of develop-
ment leading to eventual increases in per capita consumption could be
financed largely from domestic resources but that foreign capital must
play an important, in fact critical9 role if Indonesian economic growth
is to be assured. We have argued that domestic resources should be
mobilized through devices which will limit the short-run inflationary
consequences of diverting current resources to production of capital
Grasberg's figure (op. cit. Table 6) for required gross invest-
ment in the first year of the new level of investment is Rp. 18.2 billioa
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goods. Rough estimates of the order of magnitude have been assigned
to the capital needs of the economy and the investment resources
which might be mobilized by the suggested devices to meet these needs.
These estimates should be regarded as extremely tentative; detailed
studies on both sides of the economic ledger are suggested before plan-
ning be undertaken on the basis of the limited and preliminary studies
to which we now have access.
A major implication of the pattern of financing outlined here is
that mobilization of investment resources and the administration of
development investment itself would be carried out by local govern-
ments as well as by the central government. About 17 to 22 per cent
of the new fiscal resources for development would come from local gov-
ernments, according to mry estimates; and, to this extent, the investment
program mould be prosecuted on a decentralized basis rather than through
the central government. The question then occurs as to whether or not
local administrative facilities are available to carry out investment
at these levels of government. My own impression is that a reservoir
of competent officials, not fully utilized under the present system
of inter-governmental division of functions, exists at these levels.
A more serious economic question is whether or not the resources made
available at the local level could be integrated into a general devel-
opment program aimed at increasing production. The problem is that
resources mobilized by localities tend, by their nature, to be highly
It
localized. However, it is my opinion that Indonesia's development pro-
gram will have to concentrate in part on providing basic local facilities
such as irrigation works, transportation facilities and small-scale,
state-operated productive enterprises. What evidence we have suggests
that local investment resources can most easily be mobilised in the
outlying islands where these facilities are most lacking. In my ex-.
perience, local governments already assign high prionrity to productive
projects and allocate resources on the basis of estimates of the pro--
ductivity of alternate uses.0 5 Thus it appears that diversion of local
financial resources to projects related to the country's economic growth
is not an insurmountable problem.
Moreover, the degree of decentralization implicit in the composi-
tion of fiscal and financial resources suggested by this study may well
ease the process of transformation of financial resources into capital
goods. Japan's experience suggests that capital formation in the
sectors appropriate to local investment and the early stages of devel-
opment can largely be realised from conversion of resources available
to the underdeveloped econony.46
There are also important publicity aspects related to the program
recommended here. The pattern of financing is obviously one of auster-
ity since it implies generally reduced levels of consumption, particularly
In fact, in one area I found rather sophisticated use of cap-
ital-output ratios to establish investment criteria
46 ockwood The Ecoromic Development of Jacan 'Pri nceton, 1955).,
Chapter 5,, especiairy ll. ioan -- 1
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among the upper income groups. Yet, it is emphasized that by tying
local benefit to sacrifice it might become clear to the Indonesian
peooile that eventual increases in consumption will re'sult from the
government program and that today's sacrifice would be tomorrow's
gain. Thus the local aspect of financing the program may well be a
blessing in disguise. Finally, this program may well tend to allay
some of the existing political objections to foreign participation
in the financing of Indonesian economic development. Recognition
of the fact that domestic financing of investment entails sacrifice
in the way of reduced consumption may well add to the attractiveness
of foreign capital. Again, the fact that the program outlined here
calls for substantial domestic financing implies that the domestically
owned sector will be rapidly expanded relative to the foreign-owned
sector even if foreign capital enters as direct investment. New pro-
ductive facilities will be primarily Indonesian owned and the scope
of foreign ownership will be circumscribed by the overall financing
of the program itself. If it is clear that the indigenous role will
be the dominant one in financing and prosecuting development, fear of
foreign domination in the modern sector may be considerably reduced
and foreign capital may be welcomed as a complement in the total pro-.
gram for Indonesia's economic progress0
